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BSTRCT
Thepaper uses a small analytical
two—region (the United Statesand
the Rest of the Industrial
World) model, to analyzethree issuesConcerning
international economic interdependenceand macroeconomicpolicy coordination
that have been raised in
connection with the September1985 World Economic
Outlook published by the IMF.They are: (1) What should bethe monetary
and/or fiscal response inthe Rest of the IndustrialWorld to a tightening
of U.S. fiscal Policy andwhat should be the U.S.monetary response?
(2) What Should be the
monetary and/or fiscal response inthe United States
and in the Rest of theIndustri World to a"Collapse of the U.S. dollar?"
The paper highlights theimportance of determining thecauses of such
a "hard landing" for the U.S.dollar, as the appropriatepolicy responses
are very sensitive tothis; (3) What should be the
macroeconomic policy
response in the Industrial World
to a disappointing realgrowth performance?
Again the correct identification
of the reason(s) for thedisappointment
is shown to be crucial.
The final Section
discusses and qualifies theactivist policy
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macroeconomic policycoordination. In thispaper I take up three
policy issues that
were the subject of
widespread discussion, both in the Fund and
outside it duringthe periodleading up to the
publication of the WEO. Theyare:
(1) What shouldbe the monetary
and/or fiscalresponse in the rest of the industrialized
world to a unilateral
tightening of U.S. fiscal
policy and what shouldbe the U.S.
monetary response?
(2) What shouldbe the monetaryand fiscal
response in the industrialized
countries to a
sudden, large changein an important
exchange rate' For
concreteness I shallrefer to thisevent as a"collapse of the U.S.
dollar"; and
(3) What shouldbe the policy
response in the industrialized
world toa disappointingreal growthperformance?
Allthree issues
are clearly ofmore than academic
interest. In this paper I attempt to
give qualitatveanswers using asimple analytical model. However
simple the individual
country modelsmay be, the inter—
dependent globaleconomic systerverysoon grows toolarge for analytical
treatment; numerical
simulation methodsare called for. Ipropose to investigate thesesame issues usinga richer and more
detailed three- country or
three—region numerical
simulation model ina sequel to this paper. Recent
work by SachsE19851 and by Sachsand McKibbin [1985] has
demonstrated theusefulness of such
an approach. Theadvantages in termsof intuition
and insight fromkeeping thingssufficiently small—2—
and transparent to permitasimple algebraic and diagrammatic analysis
are such, however, that a firstpass at this problem "in two dimensions"
is justified.
Section 11.1 outlines the simpletwo—country Dornbusch—style model
with a floating exchangerate, perfect capital mobility, rationalexchange
rate expectations and gradual priceadjustment. The long—run or steady—
state comparative statics are reviewed inSection 11.2 while Section 11.3
characterizes the nature of the dynamicadjustmentprocess. Possible
responses to a tightening of U.S. fiscalpolicy are reviewed in Section
III. In Section IV possibleresponses to a collapse of the U.S. dollar
are considered and Section V deals withthepolicy implications of a
slowdown in world economicactivity. Qualifications and conclusionsare
found in Section VI.
II.An Analytical Approach
11.1. The model
Consider the simple two-countryor two—region version of the
Dornbusch [1976] open macroeconomicmodelwith afreely floating exchange
rate and perfect capital mobilitygiven in equations (1)—(12) below.
Except for some inconsequential
differences, this model is the one used
by Miller [1982]. (See also Buiter[1985a] for another application.)
All variables other than interestrates are in natural logarithms.
All coefficients arenon—negative. Country 1 will be referred toas














a1isthe nominalmoneystock of countryi, p4its GDPdeflater,Yj its
real output, ij its nominalinterest rate andr1 its real interest rate.
e is the nominalexchangerate, expressed as the number of unitsof
countryl's currencyperuniiofcountry 2's currency. fjisa measure
of fiscal stance incountry j, is country i's tax rateon interest
incomeaccruing from abroadand its subsidy rate on the interestcost of
borrowingfrom abroad. These taxes drivea wedge between the domestic
nominalinterestrate and the interest rate on loansdenominated in the
samecurrency overseas. cisthe realexchange rate or Competitiveness
and1jcountryi's stock of real money balances.
The model has rationalexchangerate expectations and rational
inflation expectationsby investors. The exchange rate isset in an
efficient,forward—looking assetmarket. It canmake discrete 'jumps"—4-.
at a point intime inresponse to "news".
Domestic costs
(Pj) are
predetermined (i.e.given at a point in
time), buttheirrates of change respond to excessdemand orsupply and "coreinflation".
The model willhave short—run
"Keynesian" butlong—runclassical or monetarist features.
Each country'sdemand for real
money balances varies positively with Itsownnationalincome and negativelywith its own nominalinterest rate
ij. 1/ There is no
endogenous directcurrency substitution. A shift
parameter nisadded to allow
for portfolio shifts. The demandfor each
country's outputdepends on its realinterest rate rj. on
competitiveness, c,on the other
country's level ofreal income and on the
domestic fiscal
impulse f3. Domesticcosts are governed by an augmented
Phillips curve. The
(logarithm of the)level of capacity
output j (or thenatural rate of
unemployment) in eachcountry is exogenous. The
augmentation term inthe Phillipscurve is taken tobe the current
rate of growth of
ie money stockmj. This is done merely to permit a
simple diagrammatic
analysis of the model's
properties. More satisfactory ways ofmodellin; the
augmentation term arediscussed LaBuiter
1/ We could
specify the de-andfor realmoney balances asa demand for
money balances interms of th
country's consumptionbundle. Letcountry
l's consumerprice index a weightedaverage of the domesticvalue
added deflatorand the domest.
c currency value ofthe foreignvalue added
deflator, i.e. +







Thisequals our equation(1) when
k1—l. Nothing substantialis lost and
some notational
simplicity is gained
by sticking withequation (1).—5—
and Miller [1982,
l983a,bJ and will beincorporated in the largermacro—
economic model that is
solved using numericalmethods in a Sequel tothis
paper.
Thetwocountries are not only linkedvia competitivenessand
activity effects but also
directly through an integratedinternational
financial market.Equation (5) representsthe condition for(after—tax)
uncovered interestparity. US and ROW
currency._.denominated interest—
bearing assets are perfect
substitutes in private
portfolios. This will
be the case if the
international financialmarkets are efficientand
there are risk—neutral
speculators.
It will be convenient
to represent theessential dynamicsofthis
mini—worldeconomicworld through threestate variables,
ij,j—1,2,real.
moneybalances in each of thetwo countries andc, U.S.A. competitiveness
11.2.The long runequilirj,
The long—run comparatjvestatics in this modelare completely
classical or monetarist
Outputineach country is at its
exogenously
given full emplontlevel aridchanges in the levels andgrowth rates of
nominal money stocksare translatedinto
corresponding changes in the
levels and
proportional rates of changeofcosts and of the exchange
rate. Equatj0
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In the longrun (at full
mployment) fiscalexpansion in the U.S. worsens U.S.
competitiveness whilefiscal expansionin the ROWcauses U.S. competitivenessto improve.Neitherchanges in the levelsnor in the rates ofgrowth of the nominal
money stocks affect real
competitiveness or real interest
rates. Fiscal
xpanaion in the United
States or in the ROW raises theworld real interest
rate. (note that theU.S. and ROWreal
(13g) r j-[S12f2+21f1]+
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interestrates differ only to theextent that tJ.S. and ROW taxes(øubgjdjg)
on foielgn interest income (costs)differ. An increase in —T2 lowers
the U.S. real interestrate and raises that in the ROW.Competitiveness
therefore must move against theU.S.A. to restore equilibrium inthe
market for U.S. ouput. Anincreases in mj raisesPj and the rate of
depreciation of country i'scurrency by the same amount. A highernominal
interest rate reduces the stockof real money balances demandedin the
long run, if the interest—sensitivity
of the demand for realmoney balances
is non—zero. Given the
rate of money growth (and thus therate of infla—
tion), expansionary fiscalpolicy in either country, byraising the real
interest rate, also raises thenominal interest rate and reducesthe
demand for real money balancesat home and abroad.
Anincrease in the level ofcapacity outputGj)ofa country is
associatedwith an improvement in itslong run competitiveness. This is
required in order for the marketto absord the relativelygreatersupply
ofthatcountry'soutput. AssumingthatS12c21 —12and2112
—12
areboth negative, an increasein the level of capacityoutputin either
countrylowers the long—run realinterest rate in both countries; the
lowerrealinterest rates stimulate demandandbringit back to equality
with thelarger level of full employmentoutput. Both directly, via the
income effect onmoney demand and indirectly, by lowering thenominal
interestrate (since real interest declineand money growth is held
Constant), increased capacity
output in either country raises the long—
run stock of realmoney balances in both countries.—8—
11.3. The
dynamic responseto policychanges and
exogenous shocks The three
slmultaneou8state equationsof the








structures, it becomes possible toprovide an
analytical and















relationships will require numerical
simulation methods.
The simplified
two—country model does, however,permit a very
transparent firstpass at the
major policy issues. Symmetryinthis model






restriction of identicalstructures isimpoed. A
two—dimensional
system involvesthe real exchangerate and the
difference betweenthe two
countries' real money stocks.Let l' —
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Aone—dimensional system involvesonly averages or global magnitudes.
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Global or average economicperforisnce and the differencebetween
the economic performancesof the two countries
are "decoupled": they can
be studied independently ofeach other, with averageoutcomes a function
only of current and past
average policy instrument values andaverage
exogenous shocks, while performancedifferences are a functiononly of
differencesin current, pastand expected future differencesin policy
instrumentvalues and exogenos disturbances.The "averages"model
(equations (14b) and (15b))can indeed be viewed asa self—contained
modelof a single closedeconomy. Because the price deflatorsare pre-
determined and the realexchange rate "washes out" through theassumption
of symmetrical
structures, the "averages" modelcontains no nonpredeter—
mined,forward—loolcjng or jump variables. Inthe richer structure of
the simulation modelin the sequel to thispaper, the average or global
economy does contain forward—looking
variables, through forward—looking
invest decisions (Tobin'q) and wage setting. Note thatafter
analyzing and averagesand differences, we caneasily retrieve individual











The"averages" economy (equation 14b) withits single predetertnjnd
state vriab1e will be stable if andonly if —''X1(2 — <0 that is
i.f.f.
(17a) fl > c
The "differences" system(equation 14a) with its predetermined
variable 1d and its non—predetermined
variable c, will have a unique
convergent saddlepoint equilibrium if andonly if a11 a22 —21l2 < 0
that is i.f.f.
(17b) > —c
Since c >0, (17a) implies (Jib)
>-c is equivalent to thecondition that an in1provenent inU.S.
competitiveness will (given 1d, d d, fdd rd) raise the effective
demand for tT.S.outputrelative to output in the rest ofthe world. It
is a weak Condition, which
amounts to assuming that in a diagramwith the
nominal interest rate on thevertical axis and output on thehorizontal
axis, the IS curve(afterusing the Phillips curve to Substituteout the
(expected) rate of inflation) is
either downward—sloping orupward—sloping
and steeper than the LMcurve. I assume that li(a) is satisfied.Given
(17a) (and thereby (l7b)), thesaddlepoint equilibrju and the "differences"
system either looks like Figure la (whenthe IS curve is downward—sloping
a22 > 0 3/ and the —O locus is
upward—sloping) or like Figure lb (when
the IS curve is
upward—sloping and steeper than the LMcurve, a22 < 0 and
the 0 locus is downward—sloping
and cuts the 1d,_0 locus fromabove).
Since the phase diagram isqualitatively similar in the twocases, I shall
restrict the analysis to thecase depicted in Figure 1(a).Figure 1(c)
depicts the adjustmentprocess of the single predeterminedstate variable
for the "averages"System.— 13—
Firstamong the policy issues to be considered now is the proper
response in the ROW to a unilateral U.S. fiscal contraction.
III. Responses to a tightening of U.S. fiscal policy
111.1. U.S.fiscaltightening without fiscal or monetary response
in the ROW and without monetary response in the U.S.A
A fiscal tightening in the U.S.A. without any fiscal response in the
ROW is, in the notation of this paper, a reduction in theaverage fiscal
impulse (fe) and a reduction in the difference between the two countries'
fiscal impulses fd which is twice as large as the reduction in a. From
equations 16(a—e) it is clear that the long—run consequences of this
unilateral fiscal contraction will he the following:
(1) an improvement in the U.S.A's competitiveness Ccincreases);
(2) a lowering of the real interest rate in the U.S.A. and in the
rest of the world;
(3) an increase in the world real money stock because nominal
as well as real interest rates are lower in the U.S. and in the
R.O.W.
In Figure 2a we see that for c and 1d, the full long—run adjustment
from E1 to E2 occurs instantaneously. Relative US—ROW realmoney balances
are unaffected by the U.S. fiscal tightening. The required long—run
depreciation in the real exchange rate can therefore be brought about
iediately by a jump or step depreciation in the nominal exchange rate
of the United States.— 14—
Inthe new long—run equilibrium the global stock ofreal money
balances viii be larger since lover nominal interest ratesraise velocity.
Given nominal money growth rates in the U.S. and the ROW andwithout any
discrete changes in the levels of the nominalmoney stocks, the process
of increasing real balances requires that the rate of inflationbe held
below the given rates of growth of the nominalmoney stocks. There will
therefore be a temporary global recession: ya declines. Theglobal
recession affects the U.S. and the R.O.W. equally: y4 iszero throughout
the adjustment process. U.S. output declines because ofthe fiscal
tightening but the decline is mitigated somewhat as competitiveness
improves. The ROW suffers from its loss of competitiveness, whichmirrors
the improvement In the U.S. competitiveness. Therecession is therefore
concentrated in the non—traded goods sector of the U.S. andthe traded
goods sector of the ROW. Nominal and real interestrates and inflation
rates in the U.S. and the ROW are affected equally by theU.S. fiscal
contraction: id, r'1 and are zero throughtout. Both nominal and
real interest rates decline globally (and in eachcountry). As in the
familiarclosed economy IS—Il.!, augmented Phillips curvemodel, the decline
in nominal and real interest ratesmitigates the contraction of aggregate
demandbut doesnot undo it completely.There is "crowding out" (in our
policy experiment a reversal of crowding out) but less than 100percent.
Note that because inflation declinesduring the recession, real interest— 15—
ratescome down by less than nominal interest rates. Figure 3suarizeg
the response to the unexpected announcement at timet0 of an imediately
implemented permanent tightening of U.S. fiscal policy. 1/
111.2 Monetary policy stabilizes the nominalexchange rate
One of the scenarios considered in the WEO consists ofa tightening
of U.S. fiscal policy, unaccommodating U.S.monetary policy, unchanged
fiscal policy in the ROW and monetary policy in the ROWgeared to interest
rate coupling. Given perfect international capitalmobility, interest rate
coupling amounts to having a fixed nominal exchange rate. Undera fixed
exchange rate regime, a fiscal contraction in the U.S.will, with perfect
capital mobility, lead to a stock—shift outf low ofcapital from the U.S.,
a stock—shift loss U.S. foreign exchange reserves anda corresponding
contraction in the U.S. money stock. The ROWexperiences the counterpart
stock—shift inflow of capital, stock—shift gain inforeign exchange
reserves and expansion of its mbney stock. It is thereforearbitrary
whether one assigns the stabilization of theexchange rate to the monetary
policy of the ROW or to the U.S. Under a fixed exchangerate regime
(which is expected to be permanent) there iseffectively a single global
world money market or world UI schedule. Individualcountries can choose
their own rates of domestic credit expansion andthus collectively
determine the growth of the worldmoney stock. The distribution of this
world money stock across countries is determinedby the individual countries'
1/ For i to decline less on impact than in thelong run, we must assume
that l—y*—e > 0. For ra to decline lesson impact than in the long











moneydemand functions, with reserve flows making up the difference
betweerrchangesin domestic money demand and domestic credit expansion.
The formal analysis of the fixed exchange rate regime isvery
simple. Let the global stock of gold and foreign exchange reserves be
constant and, for notational simplicity, equal to zero. The globalmoney
stock is therefore the sum of the two countries' stocks of domestic
credit. Let m be the logarithm of the global nominalmoney stock, Dj the
logarithm of country i's stock of domestic credit and V the share of U.S.
domestic credit is total domestic credit.
(18a) m VD1 +(l—v)D2 O<v<l.
Setting the logarithm of the fixed nominal exchange rate equal to zero,
we define the global price level, p, as follows:
(18b)pVp1+(l—v)p2
Theglobal money demand shock nissimilarly defined as:
(18c) ii— vr1+(l—v)n2
and global income as
(18d) yvy1 +(1—v)y2
is the proportional rate of growth of country i's domestic
credit. (Under a freely fi:ating exchange rate regime, in1.) The
augmentation term in the Phillips curve is taken to be the policy—determined
ijratherthan the endogenously determined inj.Nofixed exchange rate
regime is viable unless inflation rates converge. I therefore impose
—— i. Thisstill permits short—term divergence of inflation
rates. Also define jij—i2+ — r1.The model consists of— 17—






For algebraic simplicity and in order to retaincomparability with
thefloating exchange rate case, both countries are assumed to be of
equal size so V—1/2.
The fixed exchange rate version has two statevariables, 1 and c
whichareboth predetermined. The equations of motion and the detertni—
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Notethat average global realliquidity under the fixed exchange
rate regime (1/2 £ given inequation (24)) behaves identically toaverage
global real liquidity under thefreely floating, exchange rate regime (1a
given in equation 14(b)). 1/ Thesame holds for average world output.
(Compare equation (27) with y8 fromequation (15b)). It is also checked
very easily that the long—run, steady stateeffects of fiscal policy (or
other real shocks) are thesame under fixed and floating rates.
When therefore we compare theconsequences of a tightening of U.S.
fiscal policy under a floatingexchange rate with that under a fixed
exchange rate, holding globalmonetary policy constant in the sense that
the growth rates of domesticcredit (and therefore the growthrate of the
global stock of nominal, money)are the same in the two regimes, the
recession in the U.S. following the fiscalcontraction will be smaller
under a floating exchange rate whilein the ROW the recession will be
deeper with a floating rate.
The global loss of output is thesame under the two exchange rate
regimes, butwhileunder a floating rate the recesions inthe U.S. and
the ROW are identical in
magnitude (although in the U.S. thenon—traded
goods sector will, be hit while in theROW it will be the traded goods
sector), under a fixed rate tie U.S. willalways experience a deeper
recession. It is even possi1je thatunder a fixed rate the ROW would
experience a net boost tooutput.






Several points can be made about the fixed exchange rate system.
First, stability requires that K1+K2 > 0andthat K1—K2 > 0. This is
equivalent to requiring that K1 > 0and> 0. However, K2 could be
either positive or negative. With a fixed exchange rate, fiscal contrac-
tion in the United States will therefore definitely lower U.S. real output
(from (25) —i- —K11> 0) but it mayeitherraise or lower real output
af1
in the ROW (2 ——K2A1).If K2 < 0, the depressing effect on the
ROW'sexport sector of a decline in U.S.demand outweighs the beneficial
effect of lower worldwide interest rates (t>4ykX1in 26b) and the
ROW experiences a slump.If thecrowding in" effect is stronger than
the direct demand effect, (K2 > 0)thenthe ROW expands while the U.S.
contracts. Even ifoutputin both countries declines, the decline will
besteeperin the United States.
Itis easilychecked that, if the U.S. and ROW are of similar size,
totalworldoutput always contracts, even in the case where output in the
ROW is stimulated by lower interest rates:
(27) a —(K1+K2"A14+ (K1+K2)1yu—(K1+K2Y"rX'ii
+(K1-4-K2Y'fa —(Ki+K2Y'ii
—aFigure 3
Global and Regional Response to a Unilateral
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Theshort—run behavior of the real exchange rate is quite different
under the two regimes. As shown in Figure 3, under a floating exchange
rate U.S. competitiveness, which is a non—predetermined variable in this
case, sharply improves on impact to its new equilibrium level. This
jump—depreciation of c reflects a jump—depreciation of e, the nominal
exchange rate. While this clearly represents a hard landing for the U.S.
dollar, it represents a imich softer landing for the U.S. real economy
than the alternative scenario where the nominal exchange rate is kept
constant throughout. In the latter case U.S. competitiveness improves
gradually after the U.S. fiscal contraction and converges asymptotically
to the same level achieved immediately with a freely floating exchange
rate. The improvement in competitiveness is due to the U.S. rate of cost
inflation falling below that in the ROW because of the relatively deeper
recession in the U.S.
111.3 Policies that achieve an improvement in U.S.
competitiveness witout a contraction of world demand
In this subsection I take as given the fiscal tightening in the
United States as well as :he achievement of a lasting improvement in U.S.
external competitiveness. A floating exchange rate is again assumed.
A ROW fiscal expansion to match the U.S. fiscal contraction
In the formal setting our little model, the transition to improved
U.S. competitiveness can be achieved instantaneously and without any
contraction of effective demand at home or abroad by having the U.S.
fiscal contraction matched by a corresponding ROW fiscal expansion.. InC2
Cl
Figure 4
Response to a U.S. fiscal contraction and a matching ROW fiscal expansion.
1a— 21—
terof the dynamics of equations (l4a,b)and (15a,b) and the steady—
state conditions of equations (16a—e), this"package" consists of a
reduction in fd with f unchanged.Figure 4 shows the instantaneous
adjustment process.
There is no change in real or nominalinterest rates as the effects
on the global capital market of the twoopposing fiscal impulses cancel
each other out. For a given U.S. fiscal
contraction, the improvement in
U.S. competitiveness is now doubled (inour linear model) because of the
fiscal expansion in the Row. Worldaggregate demand is unchanged and so
is aggregate demand for each individualcountry's output.
There are several qualifications to bemade before this painless
adjustment package is recornmended foruse in the real world. First,
while total output stays constant ineach country, there is a shift
towards the production of tradeables in theU.S. and towards the production
of noritradeables in the ROW. Steelworkersmake poor hairdressers and
conversely. The problems sociated withchanging the sectoral composition
of production, employment ad investmentare ignored in our simple model.
Second, the selection of dosage andtiming for the ROW fiscal
expansion is made to look 1rnpler than it is inpractice because of the
assumption of known, idenIcal structures.While this in no way weakens
the case for a flexible policy
response in principle, it makes the
practical task of selecting the rightmix, dose and timing a much more
complicated matter than our iimple modelmay suggest.— 22—
Third,a fi8cal expansion in the ROW may be opposed for structural or
allocative reasons. Increased public spending may be undesirable because
of its political irreversibility and because, at full employment, the
benefits from the spending are judged to be less than its cost. Lower
taxes or higher transfer payments may be undesirable because of possible
efficiency losses, undesirable incentive effects or for distributional
reasons.
Fourth, fiscal expansions (other than balanced—budget fiscal expan-
sions) entail larger deficits and, in time, a larger public debt. If the
real interest rate exceeds the growth rate of the real tax base, explosive
debt—deficit spirals are possible unless the primary (non—interest) deficit
is planned (and believed) to become a surplus in due course. If there is
no reputation for fiscal rectitude, temporary (increases in) deficits
will be extrapolated int.o the future. Fear of possible future monetization
of deficits u-ill raise long nominal interest rates. Increased uncertainty
about the future course of inflation may add a further risk premium to
therequired rate of return onnominal governmentdebt.In extreme
circumstances,fear of partial or complete debtrepudiation or of special
capitallevies and surcharges maybuilda risk premiuminto the rate of
returnon all public debt (See Blanchard, Buiter and Dornbusch[1984]and
Buiter[l985b]). A good reputation for underlying fiscal rectitude would,
however, avoid the potential crowding out resulting from such confidence
effects. It might therefore help if such a program were supervised by or
at least coordinated through an organization such as the I whose
reputation f or fiscal restraint is second to none.
I— 23—
Finally,it may be judged that the global level of effective demand
jgcurrentlyexcessive, and that a net reduction in global demand is in
order, as well as a realignment of U.S.competitiveness. A unilateral
U.S. fiscal contraction might in that case be the right policy. The
point would seem to be mainly of academic interest, as in the opinion
of most observersthere remains a marginof Keynesian slack in the world
economy.
A U.S. fiscal contraction matched by effective demand—
maintainingexpansionary monetary policy changes
Calls for a change in the U.S. macroeconomic policy mix, from tight
money and loose fiscal policy to looser money and tighter fiscal policy
have been heard from all corners of the profession in recentyears.
There are two kinds of monetary policy changes that could be used in the
present model: changes in level of the nominal money stock and changes
in the proportional growth rate of the nominalmoney stock.
Money jumps"
It is clear from inspection of the steady state conditions (16a, e)
and the equations of motion (14a, b) and (15a, b) that there isone and
only set of discrete (discontinuous) changes in the levels of the nominal
money stocks in both countries that will permit an instantaneous transition
at full employment (in both countries) to the new real long run equilibrium
associated with the unilateral reduction in the U.S. fiscal impulse dis-
cussed in Section 111.1. If df1 < 0 is the size of the U.S. fiscal
contraction, these nominal money jumps in both countries are given by
(28)dm1 —dm2—— df1— 24—
Atthe predetermined price level, thisnominal money jump provides
ju8t tfie right increase in realmoney balances demanded as a result of
the lower nominal (and real) worldinterest rate associated with the
lower global fiscal impulse. Thereis no need to force the price level
path below the nominal money stockpath through a policy of demand
deflation and unemployment. Thesteady state increase in real money
balances which in a new—classical modelwith a non—predetermined, flex—
ible price level would be broughtabout by a discrete downward jump in
the price level path, is achieved inthe Keynesian,predeterminedprice
level model by a stock—shiftopen market purchase in each country which
increases the nominal
money stocks by the required amounts, It is the
stickiness of real money balances whichmakes a recession inevitable when
there is any exogenous shockor policy change which raises the long—run
demand for money balances. Thisstickiness of the real money stock
reflects both the stickiness of domesticcosts (assumed to be a policy—
and exogenous shock—invariantstructural property of private market
behavior), and the stickiness ofmonetary policy. If the level of the
nominal money stock is a choicevariable at any given instant, policy
flexibility can make up for andcompensate for domestic cost inflexibility.
The great advantage of the kind ofonce—and—for—all nominal money
stock jumps considered here is thatthey don't result in any change in
the rate of inflation, short
run or long run. They do cause thelong—run
level of the path of pricesto be higher than it would otherwise have— 25—
been,but since welfare costs are associated with the rate of inflation
rather than with the level of prices, 1/ this is no cause for concern.
Themajor problemwith money jump policies is their effect on inflationary
expectations. The obvious analytical distinction between a discontinuous
discrete change in the level of the money stock path and a (finite)
change in the instantaneous rate of change of that path may not be as
obvious in practice, especially when the money stock path is sampled at
discrete time intervals: a once—and—f or—all upward level change at a
point in time in the middle of an observation interval t0 may look much
like an increase in the rate of growth between t0 and t0 + 1. If such
an apparent increase in the growth rate gets extrapolated into the
future, serious instability may result. Governments or central banks
with a reputation for monetary rectitude will be able to engineer once—
off money jumps without adverse effects on inflationary expectations.
Governments or central banks with a reputation for monetary laxness will
be prisoners of the markets' lack of confidence and may have to live with
the adverse effects on inflation expectations of any observed increase
in the money stock.
Note that if the monetary authorities had nominal income targets
rather than monetary targets, there should be no credibility problems
associated with a once—off increase in the nominal money stock. Nominal
1/ The statement is meant to apply to a world without uncertainty only.— 26—
incometargets are velocity—corrected monetary targets.They have
desirable operating characteristics wheneverexogenous shocks or policy
changes necessitate a change in velocity.
Changes in money growth rates
The other monetary policy action (in bothcountries) that can achieve
the transition to an improved level of U.S.competitiveness without any
output or employment cost is an equal permanent increasein the rate of
growth of the nominal money stock in eachcountry. It can again be
checked from the steady—state conditions (16a)—(16e)and from the
equations of motion (14a, b) and (15a, b) that thefollowing permanent
increase in m1 andm2willachievean instantaneous transition at full
employment (in both countrog) to the new reallong—run equilibrium
associated with the unilatral reduction in theU.S. fiscal impulse
discussed in Section 111.1.
(29)drn drn a_Ldfi 1 2 2y
This monetary policy respcne would,by raising the rate of inflation in
both countries, prevent the global realinterest rate decline result1g
from the U.S. fiscal contraction frombeing translated into a decline in
nominal interest rates. With nominal interestrates unchanged, there s
no increase in the demand for realmoney balances and consequently no
need for a recession to depress thegeneral price level path below the
nominal money stock path. The policy hasone obvious undesirable fea:re:
a recession is prevented at the cost ofhaving a permanently higher e
of inflation in the worldeconomy.r
— 27—
IV.Respon to a Collapse of theU.S. Dollar
A second question addressedby eicpolicy makersand analysts is t}
properresponse (in the U.S. ndin theRow) to a sudden large fallin
the value of a key
currency, taken to be the U.S. dollar forconcrete-
ness in this paper. To determinethe nature of theappropriate policy
responses, we first must determine whatthe causes of the suddendepre-
ciation of the currencyare. There are two broad classesof possible
causes: (a) the bursting of
a speculative bubble that hadcaused the
dollar to be overvalued inrelation to the "fundamentals."(b) an actual
or perceived change in thefundamentals driving theexchange rate. The
latter category can besubdivided into a number ofcases. (1) a port-
folio shift against thedollar reflecting,say, greater uncertainty about
the future prospects forU.S. inflation. In thesimple model of this
paper, this can be represented
by a reduction in U.S. liquiditypreference:
a fall in n1; (2) an increaseinthereal risk premium on foreign—oe
U.S. assets. This couldreflect fear of future increasesin taxation
of U.S. interest income
and, conceivably, a greaterperceived risk of
repudiation or default. In themodel this can be representedby an
increase in t2—11: the realrisk premium is like a nettax on U.S. interest
income; (3) an unexpectedincrease in the level of theU.S. money stock
or in the rate of U.S.
monetary growth; (4) an unexpectedtightening of
the U.S. fiscal Stance.
All four events should bethought of in relative terms,e.g., the
portfolio shift against thedollar reflects an increasein uncertainty
about u.s. inflation relative
to uncertainty about inflationin the rest— 28—
ofthe world. Similarly, it is looser U.S. monetary policy relative to
monetary policy elsewhere or tighter U.S. fiscal policy relative to
fiscal policy elsewhere that puts downward pressure on the dollar.
An important issue in determining the appropriate policy response
to a sudden drop of the dollar in response to a change in private sector
perceptions concerning the likely future course of the fundamentals, is
whether the national authorities and the international coordinatingagency
share these new perceptions. A different approach will in general be
called for if the authorities believe they have information superior to
that used by private agents in forming expectations, but there is noway
of sharing this information with private market participants or of con—
vincirig them of its relevance. In what follows, no superior public sector
information is assumed.
1.A bursting bubble
It is well—known that the solution of rational expectations models
with forward—looking, non—predetermined state variables (such as the
nominal and the real exchange rate in our model) may be characterized by
a bubble; that is, the behavior of the endogenous variables may be
influenced by variables that matter only because, somehow, privateagents
believe that they matter. These bubble processes, which affectexpec-
tations in a self—validating nanner, may be functions of the fundamental
variables (i.e. those variabl,s that enter into the structure of the
model other than merely by being part of the information set used to form
II
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expectations)or of completely extraneous or spurious variables of the
"sunspdt" variety (Blanchard (79); Azariadis [1981], Obstfeld andRogoff
[1983]). In Figure 5, it is assumed that all "fundamentalghave con-
stant values, now and in the future, that the steady state equili-
brium corresponding to these constant values for the fundamentalsis E0
and that the associated convergent saddle path isS0S0. Suppose, without
loss of generality, that the predetermined variable is at itssteady—state
value £.Thenon—predetermined variable, c, however, is on a bubble
path EE which overvalues it relative to the path warranted by the fun-
damentals (S0S0). Its value at to, the time the bubble bursts is
The bursting of the bubble moves c instantaneously to its fundamental
value c*. In a rational world, there must beuncertainty about the
direction of the discrete jump in the exchange rate atto. The instan-
taneous discrete upward jump in c and e would, if it wereanticipated
with certainty, promise an infinite rate of return toshorting the dollar
the instant before to. There could however be a set of beliefswhich at
to, attaches some probability I1, to a return to the fundamental value
(c c*_c0) and some probability 1 —"to a further discrete
downward jump in c to c1 which puts the exchange rateon a bubble path
even further removed from its fundamental value. Provided 1I0(c* —c0)+
(1—1I0)(c1—a0)—0there are no expected excess returns from taking an
open currency position. !/ It seems quite self—evident that the right




(To be continued on page 30.)— 30—
thingto do for policymakers when a bubble bursts is to sit backand
enjoy the sight. While we don't have a well—developedtheory of the
welfare economics of speculative bubbles ina world with uncertainty,
limited and asymmetrically distributed (insider/outsider)information,
there is a strong presumption that theyare costly and harmful as well as
unsustainable. It may be that the fundamental valuationto which the
1/ (Continued from page 29)
where A{ajj}, B —{bi1and z is the vector of exogenous
variables.
The General solution for c and £ can be shownto be (Buiter [1984a])
1 c(t) —
—w22W21(t)_W2211e DEtz(T)dr +w221 F(t)
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t
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A1 is thestableeigenvalue of A andA2theunstable eigenvalue.
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Fis the bubble component. It satisfiesEtF(t)A2F(t) butisotherwise
arbitrary.Figure 5







exchangerate returns when the bubble
bursts, itself represents an
unattractive equilibrium because thefundamentals (especiallycurrent and
anticipated future policy) are ina mess. That, however, is anargument
for doing something about thefundamentals, when the exchange rateonce
again reflects those fundamentals,which would have been desirableeven
if there had been no bubbleand no sudden drop in theexchange value of
the dollar.
In reality, the ending ofa speculative bubble is likely to be
associated both with major
redistribution9 of wealth and withshort—term
disruption of financial markets,
commerce and production because of bank-
ruptcies and insolvencies. Morze ofthese adjustment costs areincluded
in our formal model. I would
be surprised, nevertheless, ifit could be
shown that it is better toer a bubble with a slowpuncture than with a
quick burst. A hard landing the dollar under thesecircumstances does
not preclude a soft landing f:the world economy. Nopolicy response in
the U.S. or in the ROWseems cessary.
2.A reduction in U.S.lipiiclty preference
A downward shift in the t.
liquidity preference schedule (afall
in r) has no long runeffects competitiveness or on real or nominal
interest rates. In the short
rufl, the effects are as depicted inFigure 6.
An unexpected, immediate,peinannt reduction in iiworksjust like a
once—off increase in the levelof the U.S. money stock.The nominal and
real exchange rate jump—deprccjareg
to E01 from E0. After that thereal
exchange rate gradually moves backto its initial level and thesystem
converges to E1. In the U.S. real
economic activity booms because of— 32—
short—runlower nominal and real interest rates and because of the
improvement in competitiveness. Average world economic activity also
rises (ya increases) because of the short—run downward pressure on
nominal and real interest rates. Activity levels in the ROW are,
however, depressed, as the loss of competitiveness outweighs the effect
of lower interest rates. If the initial equilibrium was deemed satis-
factory, the obvious policy response to the fall in liquidity preference
is a matching once—off reduction in the level of the U.S. nominal money
stock. This woud leave all real and nominal variables (other than ti)
unchanged.
If the shift out of U.S. ney represents stock—shift currency
substitution and has as its counterpart a matching stock—shift increase
in foreign money demand r2, the change in competitiveness will be twice
as large. Average real world activity (ya, ia, a and ra) are unchanged
in the short run and in the long run. The behavior of c and td is like
that illustrated in the top diagram of Figure 6, but with a Bhift up and
to the left of the saddlepath that is twice as large. The U.S. experiences
a transitional boom that is matched by a transitional slump in the ROW.
The obvious way to neutralize this once—off currency substitution and
stabilize the exchange rate is to contract the U.S. money stock by —n
and expand the ROW money stock by 2• Such monetary policy changes in
addition may well have favorable effects (not formally modelled here) on
the relative changes in inflation uncertainty that may have prompted the
money demand shifts in the first place.— 33—
Anincrease in the real U.S. riskpremium
An increase in the relativeperceived real riskiness of foreign
investment in the U.S. will in thelong run raise the U.S. real and
nominal interest rates and lower theROW real and nominal interest
rates, leaving the average world ratesunchanged. The increase in U.S.
riskiness and reduction in ROWriskiness are assumed to applyonly to
foreign investors, not to domesticcapital formation in eithercountry.
Figure 7 illustrates the dynamicresponse pattern to this shock. Global
averages CL5, y5, iS, p and r5) are not affected.The U.S. economy
experiencesan itmnediate jump—depreciation of thenominal and real
exchange rate from E0toE01.
Note that the real exchangerate overshoots its long run equilibrju
value. After the initialjump there is a gradual depreciation ofthe
U.S. real exchange rate. Thenew long—run equilibrium at E1represents
a net real depreciatjon relative
to the initial one. The U.S.economy
experiences a transitory boomwhich lowers its real stock ofmoney bal-
ances. TheROWgoes through a transitory slump whichraises its real
moneybalances.
One possible policyresponse that exactly neutralizes this increase
in the U.S. foreign investment
risk premium is an equal increase
in 11— 12,
the excess of the U.S. taxrate on interest income accruing fromabroad
over the ROW's tax rate on interest
income accruing from the UnitedStates.
This would restore the initial
equilibrium immediately. Alternatively,aFigure 6





once—offincrease in the ROW's nominal money stock by A times thechange
in the risk premium and a reduction in the U.S. nominalmoney stock by
the same magnitude, would instantaneously achieve thesame long—run change
in the real equilibrium shown in Figure 7, withoutany transitional U.S.
inflation and ROW contraction. A permanent increase in theU.S. 's rate
of monetary growth and an equal reduction in the ROW'srate of monetary
growth with din1 —din2dmd ——d(riskpremium) would, in Figure 7, move
the economy immediately from E0 to E01, which wouldnow be the new long—run
equilibrium.
Policy—induced exchange rate collapses
The response of the exchange rate to changes in fiscaland monetary
policy in the United States and ROW has already been discussedin Sec-
tion III. The only point worth repeating here is thata Thard landing"
for the U.S. dollar need not representa hard landing for the U.S. economy
or for the ROW. If the initial situation is one characterizedby current
and anticipated future lax U.S. fiscalpolicy and tight U.S. monetary
policy, these fundamentals are likely to be reflected ina strong (an
'overvalued") U.S. real exchange rate. The first—bestcooperative, coordi-
nated global policy package to change this unfavorableequilibrium (fiscal
contraction in the U.S., once—off monety stock increases in theU.S. and
the ROW to meet the resulting fall in velocity) isaccompanied by a dollar
"collapse." It may seem paradoxical that the restoration ofconfidence
in the ability of the U.S. to get and keep itsbudget under control,Figure 7
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wouldbe accompanied by a fall in the U.S. dollar, butsucha view
reflects the mistaken identification of the exchange rateas an
index of national economic macho.
V. Policy Responses to a Slowdown in Global Economic Activity
The first question that needs to be answered before one can deter-
mine the appropriate U.S. and ROW policy responses to a global economic
slowdown concerns the cause(s) of this slowdown. A distinction imst be
made between a slowdown resulting from an adverse supply—side shock
(modeledin our simple model by a temporary or permanent fall iny or
Y2) and a demand—induced slowdown. Amont the latter we can again dis-
tinguish adverse money demand shocks (increases in T1andn2) and reduc-
tionsin privateU.S. or ROW demand for goods and services (which can be
representedas reductions in f1 or f2).
Adverse supply—side developments
Permanent reductions in productive capacity in the U.S. and the ROW
raise the long—run real interest rate everywhere and thus bring demand
down in line with supply. Nominal interest rates will also rise ifmoney
growth rates are unaffected and, both through real income and interest
rate effects, the demand for real money balances in both regions will
decline in the long run.Ifproductive capacity is affected equally in
both countries —y2
—) thereis no long—run change in 1d or on c.
In this case, as shown in Figure 8, the worldeconomy undergoes a bout of
excess demand and inflation in excess of the rate ofmonetary growth
I— 36—
(affectingboth regions equally) whichin the long run lowers thelong—
run stcck of money balances.
In the very shortrun, output (which is
demand—detefled) actually risesbecause higher inflationreduces the
real interest rate (nominalinterest rates rise less thanone—for—one
with the rate of inflationbecause the LM curve isnot vertical).
The policy response thatprevents the emergence of excessdemand and
inflationary pressures during thetransition to the lower levelsof
capacity Output, involves acontraction of demand whichcan be achieved
either by fiscal ormonetary means (or by a combination ofthe two). If
no long—run change incompetitiveness is desired,any fiscal contraction
should be equal in thetwo countries. Probably thesimplest coordinated
policy action that achieves the
new long—run equilibrju atE1 in Figure 8
immediately, is a reduction in
m1 and in m2 equal to (k +
If the Commoncapac1t decline at t0 is expectedto be temporary and
to be reversed at
t1, there is still no action in a_idSpace (the top
diagram in Figure8). Theworld economy experiencesa bout of excess
demandbetweent0 and t1 (moving from E01 toE02) and a bout of excess
supply after t1 (betweenE03 and Eo).Thesame reduction inm1 and in
at t0 will take the world
economy (without excess demand) from
E0 to E1
where it will stay untilt. At t1 both nominalmoney stocks should be
increased again by thesane percentage by whichthey were reduced at
in order to achievea painless and instantaneous
restoration of full
equilibrj at E1.— 37—
Anadverse permanent supply shock in the United States alone, say,
would cause a long—run worsening of the U.S. competitiveness (required to
choke off global demand for U.S. output), some increase in global real
and nominal interest rates (but less than with a coon decline in capacity
output), a decline in U.S. real money balances and a smaller decline in
ROW real money balances. On impact, there is likely to be a step appreci-
ation of the dollar. After that the real exchange rate continues to appre-
ciate gradually towards its new long—run equilibrium. Real interest
rates in the United States will be below those in the ROW during the
transition. A reduction in the U.S. nominal money stock by an amount
(k +
andan increase in the ROW nominal money stock by
—
I
will permit an instantaneous transition to the new real long—run equili-
brium with lower values of c, 1d, and 1a, avoiding the transitory infla-
tion in the United States and the transitory contraction in the ROW that
would otherwise occur.
A demand—induced slowdown in economic activity
When the cause of a disappointing level of economic activity is a
decline in some component of private demand, appropriately designed
demand management can minimize the damage and, in the present model, can
beused to avoid it altogether. Increases in private liquidity preference— 38—
(n1and n2) can be met with
corresponding once—off increases in the
levels of the nominal
money stocks——rn1 and m2. A downwardshift in the
private consumption functionsor a collapse of animal spiritscan be
offset directly bycorresponding fiscal stimuli fj andf2. If the balanced
budget multiplier theorem
retains some validity, these fiscalstimuli can
be provided withoutincreasing the deficit. Supply—side
consequences
from the tax increase
or transfer payments cuts involvedin a balanced—
budget expansion should ofcourse be taken into account (thebehavioral
links, ignored in thispaper, between fjandyj).
Notethat it is never
necessary, in response to any shock,to engineer
a permanent change inmonetary growth rates. Once—offchanges in the
levels of the nominal
money stocks (or temporary changes inmoney growth
rates) are sufficient.
VI. Conclusion
This paper presentsa rather old—fashioned study ofdemand management
in an open, interdepender-
economic system. Threecontingencies discussed
in the September 1985WorL Economic Outlookwere analyzed using an
eclectic, short—run Keyneen, long—run classical,two—country model.
The main conclusion istha n activemonetary and/or fiscal response in
both countries orregions s in general required
to minimize the costs
associated with the adjustment
process resulting from avariety of demand—side
or Supply—side shocks. Oneexception to this rule is thecase of a currency
collapse resulting from thebursting of an exchange marketspeculative bubble.A unilateral U.S. fiscal contradition
will cause a temporary slowdown of
world economic activity as wellas a sudden drop in the nominal and
real value of the dollar. Merely
preventing the nominal exchange
rate from changing does not reduce themagnitude of the global recession
or alter the long—run real adjustment thattakes place, but it would
redistribute the unchanged globalunemployment and excess capacity
burden towards the United Statesand away from the ROW. Ano—response
policy would be consistent with theachievement of improved U.S.
competitiveness at full employment if theinitial situation were
characterized not only by a U.S.fiscal-monetary policy mix that
is biased towards fiscalexpansion and monetary tightness,resulting
in a poor U.S. international
competitive position, but also by global
excess demand. An expansionary fiscalmove in the ROW or a combined
expansionary monetary policy move in both theUnited States and the
ROW or a combined expansionary
monetary policy move in both the United
States and the ROW could achievetbe desired traverse to a better
level of U.S. competitveness without
a global slump. These monetary
stimuli need not be permanentincreases in the rate ofmoney growth.
Once—off credible open marketpurchases raising the levels of the
nominal money stocks suffice.
The stabilizing policyresponse to a sudden drop in the value of the
dollar depends crucially on thereason(s) for this drop. Thebursting of a
speculative bubble has no Obviousmonetary or fiscal policy implication.
Downward pressure on the value ofthe dollar resulting from a once-off
fall in U.S. liquidity preference
calls for a matching once-off reduction
in the U.S. nominalmoney stock. Direct currency substitutionaway from— 40—
thedollar calls foropen market sales in the United Statesand open
market purchases in the ROW.
The consequences of theemergence of a real
risk premium on thereturn from foreign investmentin the United States
can be neutralized by amatching increase in the differencebetween the
U.S. tax rate on interestincome from the ROW and theROW's tax rate on
Interest income from theUnited States. Alternatively,
one might accept
the depreciai of thenominal and real U.S.exchange rates but avoid
the transitional u.s.inflation and ROW contraction
by expanding the
money stock in the ROW andreducing it in the United States.
The stabilizingpolicy response to a Slowdownin global economic
activity depends on whetherthis slowdown reflects
a deterioration of the
supply side or deficient
aggreagte demand. To avoidthe stagflatjo that
would othejse resultfrom a global adverse
supply shock, demandreducing
measures are called for in
both countries. If thesupply shock is
temporary, the restrictive
measures can be reversedwhen capacityoutput
recovers, thus maintaining
caDacity output. The
stabilizing response toa fall
in private demandfor goods mdservices is a fiscalstimulus. The contrac_
tionary effects of anincrease in liquidity
preference can be avoidedby
an accomodating
(non_inflationary) increase inthe level of themoney stock.
The fiscal stimulidiscussed in thispaper are to be interpretedas
"discretionary" changesover and above the automatic
changes in tax
receipts and transferpayments that reflect the
workings of existing tax
and benefit laws,rules, and regulationsas the level of economic
activity
varies, and that may dampen but
never eliminate such fluctuations.— 41—
Toprovide truly satisfactory answers to the questions raised in the
WEO tM model of this paper would have to be extended in a number of
directions. The WEO approaches the macroeconomic issues of the indus-
trialized world in a three—region setting: the United States; Europe;
and Japan plus Canada. The complexity entailed in going to three regions
virtually obliges one to use numerical rather than analytical methods.
The model of this paper ignores all stock—flow asset dynamics, those
coming from the government budget identities, those coming from the
current account of the balance of payments, and those resulting from real
capital accumulation. 1/ Again, their incorporation requires the use of
numerical methods. Finally, it would be extremely desirable to allow
explicitly for uncertainty. Adding some linear stochastic processes with
known coefficients to the deterministic model is feasible but does not
constitute much of an advance. Anything more complicated, even linear
models with stochastic coefficients, let alone non—linear stochastic
models, means that we enter the mathematical or computational stratosphere.
The modelling language we would like to use just does not exist yet.
The logic of the model used in this paper, and indeed of any model
that permits persistent disequilibrium or non—Walrasian equilibrium is
that monetary and fiscal policy instruments can be used actively to
stabilize output, employment, and the price level in response to a whole
1/ For a numerical simulation model which incorporates all three
sources of asset dynamics in a two—country, full employment setting, see
Buiter (1984b).— 42—
rangeof demand or supply
shocks. To argue against suchactive policy
responses, or against the adoption of
explicity policy rules thatwould,
e.g., make monetary growth (or thedeviation of actualmonetary growth
from its expected value)a function of observable
contingencies, a case
must be made for the
technical, political or institutional
impossibility
of an active stabilization
policy.
The technicalimpossibility of stabilizationpolicy has been argued
on two grounds. There is the
argument that
in properly specified
macroeconomic models, onlyunperceived or unantici-
pated monetary policy canaffect the deviations ofactual real variables
from their "natural"or full tnformtjon values.
Fiscal policy Obviously
has allocative effectsboth in the short run and
in the long run, but it
too cannot systematically
affect the deviation of realoutput and employ-
ment from their capacity, fu.L].
employment, or natural levels. Ifdebt
neutrality prevails, the sub±tutjonof lump—gum taxes forcurrent
borrowing has no real effects
in the short run or in thelong run. These
policy ineffectivenessproposjjons for a while engaged
the interest of a
sign1fica part of the




argunt against the activeuse of stabilization
policy is much older (itgoes back at least to Milton
Friedman's work in
the fifties andsixties) but more relevant.It is a generaljza0of
the "long and variablelagg' argument used by Friedmanto make the case— 43—
against activecountercyclical use ofmonetarypolicy.Clearly, the
length cfthelag between the policyresponse and its impactonthe
variable(s) of interest (the
"Outside" lag) is irrelevantper se. It
is uncertainty about thecoefficients in the model, aboutthe order of
the lags and indeed aboutthe total specificationof the appropriate
model of the economy, that
forces one to qualify the
confident policy
preecriptives that emerge fromthe manipulation of modelssuch as the
one in this paper. The
length of the "inside lag,"
the lag between the
identification of the needto respond and themoment the policy handle
can finally be cranked,puts further constraints
on our ability to sta-
bilize the economythrough active demandmanagement.Estimatesof the
inside lag" for U.S. fiscal
policy range from a fewyears to infinity.
It should be
recognized that uncertainty aboutthe way in which the
economy works not only renders the
consequences of policy activism harder
to predict. It also
increases uncertainty aboutthe sequences of
refraining from policy activismand sticking topreannounced, unconditional
(non—contingent oropen—loop) rules. It seems
highly unlikely that a
cautioug, safety—fjt policy ofhedging one's bets in the faceof great
uncertainty would ever involve the
economic equivalent of lockingthe
Steering wheel and closing one's
eyes.
The political orinstitutional case againstactive demand management
in part relies onalleged observed asymetrje
or irreversibilities in
monetaryandfiscal policy design.Policy makers are happy tocut taxes— 44—
andraise spending forcyclical reasons duringa Slump, but arereluctant
to raise taxes and
cut Spending when the
economy is overheating anda
countercyc1jca1 quidpro quo is needed. While
there is some inform_al
evidence Supporting thisview, there are
counter_empleg too (e.g., the
increase in the
overall British tax burdenby 4 percent of GDPduring Prime Minister
Thatcher's first term).It would bevery valuable to have
more systematic evidence
on this important issueof Politicaleconomy.
The conditi05under which optimal,
Conditional stabilizationpolicy rules would be credible
(or time—Consistent)also are only justbeginning to be studied. The
study of post—World War II
economic historysuggests that stabilizing
monetary and fiscal policy
actions only have their
desired effects ifthe monetary or fiscalauthorities have "conservative
reputations for underlying
monetary soundness and fiscal
responsibility and rectitude.Without such
reputations, temporary andreversible changes
in money growth,tax rates.. Orspending schedules arelikely to be
perceived as permanent.
Su:h adverseexpectations or confidenceeffects
may lead to inflation
premj in nominal interest
rates, and even to "Super—
crowding out" or negative




policy coordinationthrough the IMF, as
the world's guardian
of sound money andfiscal restraintcould therefore
be especially
effective. There is inany case no alternative
agency with either thePrestige or the potential
expertise to desigu aset of workable— 45—
macroecononjcpolicy rules for the world economiccommunity, to argue for
their.adoptlonwith any chanceof even partialsuccess and to monitor
compliance and performance. !/
The global macroeconomicpolicy recommendations of the current WEO
can be summarized as:(1.) adherence to unconditional medium—termmonetary
growth targets; (2) continued downwardpressure on structural fiscal
deficits; and (3) limited counter—cyclicalresponsiveness of actual
deficits reflecting the partialoperation of the automatic fiscal stabi-
lizers. Such a policy package willnot prevent a global recession if and
when the United States tightens itsbudgetary stance. It is not even
sufficient to prevent the slowdown thatappears to be underway already.
The risks associated with thisstrategy are very high. Even in the
current state of the arts it is not impossibleto design a more flexible
and superior set of policyrecoiendatjons. Not for the first (or the
last) time, caution demands if notaction, then certainly being prepared
for action should the need arise.
!/ The human and materialresources devoted to the Study and manage-
ment of the world economy as a whole at the IMP(i.e., to "surveillance
with teeth") are currentlyvery limited, both absolutely and relative to
the resources devoted to individualcountry stabilization programs.— 46—
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